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Threat from Pathogens: Non-State Entities and Access to Bioweapons Read in Hindi

Threat from Pathogens: Non-State Entities and Access to Bioweapons

Pathogen peril: Non-state access to bioweapons

Concerns of non-state actors obtaining unrestricted access to biological weapons have been raised by developments in biotechnology and the availability of dual-use technologies. In the current era, biological warfare has consistently provoked a strong response from both government and individuals. But individuals who are driven by a desire for political power and who use this as an excuse for their actions frequently have less objection to the deployment of biological weapons.

International Biosecurity Governance

  • The Convention on Biological Weapons (BWC): Biological warfare is seen as a highly effective yet implausible kind of warfare. Even though there is little chance that a biological agent will be utilized in an assault, if the agent is very virulent, the impact of the strike could be significant. Under the category of weapons of mass destruction, bioweapons are typically not regarded as serious threats (WMD). Due to international agreements like the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which forbids the creation, manufacture, and purchase of biological weapons, the likelihood of biological weapons being used is very low.
  • Interpol's role: Treaties might not be sufficient to create a perfect system, nevertheless. Fighting the illegal trafficking in materials related to biological weapons requires international cooperation through agencies like INTERPOL. In order to manage information sharing, operational support, and investigative support in managing biological threats, these international organizations have published important governing agreements and instruments. These comprise international biosecurity initiatives, INTERPOL's police data and management analysis, animal agrocrime, and agroterrorism.
  • UNSC Role: In addition, the UNSC decided in Resolution 1540 (2004) to stop non-state actors from obtaining ingredients that could be used to make chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. With its most recent reaffirmation occurring in 2022, this resolution has been repeated on a regular basis. The UNSC passed Resolution 2325 in 2016 as part of its ongoing anti-proliferation initiatives.

Improving Biosecurity at Home

  • Enhancing global health security involves keeping an eye on outbreaks and reporting them, among other things. This helps stop infectious illnesses from spreading and becoming an asset for non-state actors.
  • In spite of the aforementioned treaties and agreements, worries regarding the uncontrolled use and research of biological weapons with limited preventive measures have been raised by developments in biotechnology and the increased accessibility of dual-use technologies. It is possible for non-state actors to get naturally occurring biological agents, such viruses or bacteria, and utilize them for nefarious ends.

Terrorists, Cults, and Bioweapons

  • Rarely have non-state actors used bioterrorism, or at least these acts have not been linked to more significant non-state actors; the use of bioterrorism has been for criminal purposes rather than terrorism. Nonetheless, these attacks have had far-reaching and political ramifications. For instance, the Rajneeshee Cult tried to influence local elections in Oregon, United States, in 1984 by spreading Salmonella enterica. Through a commercial farmer, the cult was able to obtain the seed bacteria since they maintained a clinical facility. Although 751 people were affected by the outbreak, officials were unable to link the illness to the cult. A Salmonella strain that was similar to this one was discovered at the cult's clinic during an investigation for additional criminal behavior. A few participants eventually acknowledged utilizing the seed bacteria to contaminate the area.
  • The notorious Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan is another example of a cult that used bioweapons. Between 1990 and 1995, the cult is said to have worked on a biological weapons program. Only after the unsuccessful March 1995 Sarin Gas assault on the Tokyo Subway was this program exposed. Subsequently, investigators found evidence of three prior unsuccessful attempts at biological attacks, one including the use of anthrax. Although details about this cult and its bioweapons program are still sketchy, their attempts to obtain the Ebola virus and use anthrax suggest ongoing, if not more serious, threats.
  • Al-Qaeda hired a biologist in 1999 so that the group might create biological weapons at a Kandahar laboratory. According to reports, the gang was connected to a biochemist who was isolating a deadly anthrax strain. An alleged "Official internal note" from the Belgian Police in 2016 purported to raise suspicions about the Islamic State's use of biological weapons. The authenticity of the memo has not yet been verified, and the US Department of Homeland Security has denied such assertions.

Taking up Biosecurity's Challenges

  • Despite international cooperation initiatives such as the BWC, the aforementioned occurrences have nonetheless happened. Although the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and other global governance mechanisms are vital for monitoring trade and environmental responsibility and accountability, and because the BWC is crucial for guaranteeing that biological weapons are not used in warfare, they do not address biosecurity for non-accountable parties, such as the non-state actors previously mentioned.
  • Additionally, every example shares another characteristic. Viral biological agents were accessible to any non-state actors without any trace. They were only kept out of research and use until they were uncovered by unsuccessful attacks or member admittance. The necessity for stricter biosecurity safeguards is highlighted by the incapacity of enforcement authorities and treaties to discover illicit research on biological weapons and their use.

Robust Biosecurity Measures Are Necessary

  • Although INTERPOL has publications and guidelines aimed at limiting bioterrorism, effective biosecurity protocols also need to control and prevent domestic access to pathogenic agents. Strong biosecurity protocols are essential to preventing unwanted access to labs and biological materials. Biological agents can be handled, stored, and transported securely to reduce the possibility that they end up in the wrong hands.
  • A thorough and coordinated effort at the national and international levels is needed to prevent non-state actors from obtaining biological weapons. In order to identify and counter such risks, it entails addressing the underlying causes, strengthening biosecurity precautions, and fostering international cooperation. Remaining vigilant and adjusting to new technologies are essential to reducing the dangers brought on by the spread of biological weapons.

Suggestions for Increasing Biosecurity

The first stage would be the establishment of biosecurity agencies under the BWC in each of the signatories nations, which would then report to INTERPOL any disparities in the transfer, trade, and acquisition of virulent biological agents. While operating independently, these organizations work together with all other national biosecurity organizations. Under the Italian G7 presidency, these agencies would also be responsible for overseeing the following, as determined by the Global Partnership on Biosecurity Working Group:

  1. Materials to be Safeguarded and Supervised: Make sure all materials that could lead to biological proliferation are tracked down and kept safe.
  2. Work together with Biosafety Laboratories: Communicate with nearby biosafety laboratories to make sure that all substances and biological agents are traced and that standard disposal techniques are used to avoid unintentional non-state access.
  3. Create and Maintain Effective Protocols: Create and maintain effective protocols to stop, anticipate, identify, and thwart intentional mishandling of biological agents.
  4. Boost Detection Capabilities: Boost national and international resources to quickly identify illicit biological agent research.

In summary

Compared to other WMDs, biological warfare poses a greater hazard that is harder to obtain and harder to identify until it is too late to mitigate. Nations must establish organizations to manage biosecurity and shield populations from biological assaults on people, animals, and crops—even as international agreements and conventions are important. Separate actions should be taken to address mishaps including leaks, medication development, and food security, working with organizations to guarantee restricted non-state access, non-leakage, and proper disposal of biological agents. We can reduce the dangers of biological warfare and protect international security by being proactive and attentive in the face of new threats.

Indian Digital Jurisprudence Read in Hindi

Indian Digital Jurisprudence

Premium Photo | Illustration of Digital law concept with law scales on data  center background Generative ai

Despite the fact that generative artificial intelligence (GAI) is a transformational force, the pre-AI legal frameworks and court precedents that now exist may not be able to adequately regulate this quickly developing technology.

Generative AI Concept of Generative AI (GAI)

Generative artificial intelligence (GAI) is a force that has the potential to revolutionize society in ways that are unimaginable. It is a type of artificial intelligence that produces content automatically, including text, images, audio, and video. Unlike traditional AI systems that are meant to identify patterns and anticipate outcomes, generative AI generates entirely new content. It is driven by foundation models, which are large AI models that are able to multitask and carry out a variety of unconventional tasks, such as summarization, question and answer, and classification.

Popular examples of generative AI tools are ChatGPT, an AI-powered chatbot created by OpenAI that can produce written content and have natural conversations with users, and Bard, a generative AI chatbot developed by Google that uses LaMDA language model technology to create new content or respond to user inquiries.

AI Generative Systems as Conduits or Intermediaries

  • Divergent opinions exist on the function of GAI tools. Despite the fact that they don't host links to external websites, some contend that they ought to be regarded as intermediaries similar to search engines. Others view them as little more than "conduits" for user prompts, where changing the prompt modifies the output and reduces the liability of the generated content, which is similar to speech from third parties.

Safe Harbor and Fixation of Liability

Liability of Intermediaries

  • Liability for hosted content on "intermediaries" is a recurring and controversial topic in Internet regulation. The Information Technology (Intermediaries Guidelines) Rules' Section 79, which grants intermediaries "safe harbor" protection against hosting content, was upheld in the historic Shreya Singhal ruling. However, this protection is only granted if the requirements for due diligence are met, as stated in Section 3(1)(b) of the regulations. Its integration with generative AI tools is still difficult, though.

Case Law

  • The Delhi High Court ruled in Christian Louboutin Sas vs. Nakul Bajaj and Ors (2018) that safe harbor protection is limited to "passive" intermediaries. But it's getting harder and harder to tell platform-generated content from user-generated content when dealing with Large Language Models (LLMs). When a user reposts material on another platform, they become liable for it; responding to a prompt from the user does not constitute dissemination in the context of AI chatbots.

Case Studies

  • Generative AI outputs have led to legal issues in many jurisdictions. For instance, in June 2023, a radio host in the United States sued OpenAI, arguing that ChatGPT had defamed him. Courts find it more difficult to determine culpability when GAI tools are classified ambiguously, especially when user reposts are involved.

The Dilemma of Copyright

Present-Day Copyright Regulations

  • "No person" shall be entitled to copyright protection other than by the Act's provisions, according to Section 16 of the Indian Copyright Act 1957. There is resistance on a global scale to provide AI-generated works copyright protection.

Important queries

  • A few important questions are whether co-authorship with a human should be required for works generated by AI, whether the user, the program, and the programmer, or both, should be recognized, and whether copyright laws already in place should be changed to address AI. "Not well equipped to facilitate authorship and ownership by Artificial Intelligence," according to the 161st Parliamentary Standing Committee Report, is the copyright act from 1957.

Legal Occupations

  • A copyright owner in India has the legal right to sue anyone who violates their work and seek damages and injunctions, among other remedies, under the present legal system. It's unclear, though, who bears responsibility for copyright violations caused by AI programs. The ability of courts to assign blame is complicated by the classification of GAI tools as middlemen, conduits, or active creators. The "Terms of Use" of ChatGPT aim to hold users accountable for any unlawful output, however it's unclear whether these clauses can be enforced in India.

Data security and privacy

Jurisprudence on Privacy

  • The Supreme Court of India's historic K.S. Puttaswamy ruling from 2017 created a solid basis for privacy law, which paved the way for the passage of the Digital Personal Data Protection Act of 2023 (DPDP). Concerns about privacy are brought up by traditional data aggregators and consent managers, but generative AI adds another level of complication.

The Right to Forget and the Right to Erasure

  • The "right to erasure" and the "right to be forgotten" are introduced by the DPDP Act. The inability of a GAI model to fully "unlearn" the information it has already ingested once it has been trained on a dataset, however, raises serious concerns regarding the manner in which people might exert control over the personal data that AI models incorporate.

How to Go After It

Acquiring Knowledge via Action

  • Think of providing GAI platforms with a sandbox approach and temporary liability immunity. In the process of obtaining information to identify legal issues that may influence future laws and regulations, this permits responsible growth.

Rights and Obligations Regarding Data
An overhaul of the data collecting procedure is necessary for GAI training. By making sure that the intellectual property utilized in training models is properly licensed and compensated, developers must place a high priority on legal compliance. Revenue-sharing plans or licensing contracts with data owners are two possible solutions.

License Difficulties
Since web data does not have a centralized licensing organization akin to copyright societies in the music business, licensing data for GAI is complicated. To secure data integrity against historical bias and discrimination, simplify licensing, and expedite data access for developers, centralizing systems analogous to stock photo websites like Getty Images is one possible option.

In summary

The legal framework pertaining to Generative AI (GAI) is unclear and has not yet developed. It necessitates a thorough reanalysis of the body of current digital law. To optimize the advantages of this potent technology while preserving individual liberties and preventing unwanted harm, a comprehensive, national strategy and tactful constitutional court interpretations are necessary.