Threat from Pathogens: Non-State Entities and Access to Bioweapons
Concerns of non-state actors obtaining unrestricted access to biological weapons have been raised by developments in biotechnology and the availability of dual-use technologies. In the current era, biological warfare has consistently provoked a strong response from both government and individuals. But individuals who are driven by a desire for political power and who use this as an excuse for their actions frequently have less objection to the deployment of biological weapons.
International Biosecurity Governance
- The Convention on Biological Weapons (BWC): Biological warfare is seen as a highly effective yet implausible kind of warfare. Even though there is little chance that a biological agent will be utilized in an assault, if the agent is very virulent, the impact of the strike could be significant. Under the category of weapons of mass destruction, bioweapons are typically not regarded as serious threats (WMD). Due to international agreements like the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), which forbids the creation, manufacture, and purchase of biological weapons, the likelihood of biological weapons being used is very low.
- Interpol's role: Treaties might not be sufficient to create a perfect system, nevertheless. Fighting the illegal trafficking in materials related to biological weapons requires international cooperation through agencies like INTERPOL. In order to manage information sharing, operational support, and investigative support in managing biological threats, these international organizations have published important governing agreements and instruments. These comprise international biosecurity initiatives, INTERPOL's police data and management analysis, animal agrocrime, and agroterrorism.
- UNSC Role: In addition, the UNSC decided in Resolution 1540 (2004) to stop non-state actors from obtaining ingredients that could be used to make chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons. With its most recent reaffirmation occurring in 2022, this resolution has been repeated on a regular basis. The UNSC passed Resolution 2325 in 2016 as part of its ongoing anti-proliferation initiatives.
Improving Biosecurity at Home
- Enhancing global health security involves keeping an eye on outbreaks and reporting them, among other things. This helps stop infectious illnesses from spreading and becoming an asset for non-state actors.
- In spite of the aforementioned treaties and agreements, worries regarding the uncontrolled use and research of biological weapons with limited preventive measures have been raised by developments in biotechnology and the increased accessibility of dual-use technologies. It is possible for non-state actors to get naturally occurring biological agents, such viruses or bacteria, and utilize them for nefarious ends.
Terrorists, Cults, and Bioweapons
- Rarely have non-state actors used bioterrorism, or at least these acts have not been linked to more significant non-state actors; the use of bioterrorism has been for criminal purposes rather than terrorism. Nonetheless, these attacks have had far-reaching and political ramifications. For instance, the Rajneeshee Cult tried to influence local elections in Oregon, United States, in 1984 by spreading Salmonella enterica. Through a commercial farmer, the cult was able to obtain the seed bacteria since they maintained a clinical facility. Although 751 people were affected by the outbreak, officials were unable to link the illness to the cult. A Salmonella strain that was similar to this one was discovered at the cult's clinic during an investigation for additional criminal behavior. A few participants eventually acknowledged utilizing the seed bacteria to contaminate the area.
- The notorious Aum Shinrikyo cult in Japan is another example of a cult that used bioweapons. Between 1990 and 1995, the cult is said to have worked on a biological weapons program. Only after the unsuccessful March 1995 Sarin Gas assault on the Tokyo Subway was this program exposed. Subsequently, investigators found evidence of three prior unsuccessful attempts at biological attacks, one including the use of anthrax. Although details about this cult and its bioweapons program are still sketchy, their attempts to obtain the Ebola virus and use anthrax suggest ongoing, if not more serious, threats.
- Al-Qaeda hired a biologist in 1999 so that the group might create biological weapons at a Kandahar laboratory. According to reports, the gang was connected to a biochemist who was isolating a deadly anthrax strain. An alleged "Official internal note" from the Belgian Police in 2016 purported to raise suspicions about the Islamic State's use of biological weapons. The authenticity of the memo has not yet been verified, and the US Department of Homeland Security has denied such assertions.
Taking up Biosecurity's Challenges
- Despite international cooperation initiatives such as the BWC, the aforementioned occurrences have nonetheless happened. Although the Convention on Biological Diversity (CBD) and other global governance mechanisms are vital for monitoring trade and environmental responsibility and accountability, and because the BWC is crucial for guaranteeing that biological weapons are not used in warfare, they do not address biosecurity for non-accountable parties, such as the non-state actors previously mentioned.
- Additionally, every example shares another characteristic. Viral biological agents were accessible to any non-state actors without any trace. They were only kept out of research and use until they were uncovered by unsuccessful attacks or member admittance. The necessity for stricter biosecurity safeguards is highlighted by the incapacity of enforcement authorities and treaties to discover illicit research on biological weapons and their use.
Robust Biosecurity Measures Are Necessary
- Although INTERPOL has publications and guidelines aimed at limiting bioterrorism, effective biosecurity protocols also need to control and prevent domestic access to pathogenic agents. Strong biosecurity protocols are essential to preventing unwanted access to labs and biological materials. Biological agents can be handled, stored, and transported securely to reduce the possibility that they end up in the wrong hands.
- A thorough and coordinated effort at the national and international levels is needed to prevent non-state actors from obtaining biological weapons. In order to identify and counter such risks, it entails addressing the underlying causes, strengthening biosecurity precautions, and fostering international cooperation. Remaining vigilant and adjusting to new technologies are essential to reducing the dangers brought on by the spread of biological weapons.
Suggestions for Increasing Biosecurity
The first stage would be the establishment of biosecurity agencies under the BWC in each of the signatories nations, which would then report to INTERPOL any disparities in the transfer, trade, and acquisition of virulent biological agents. While operating independently, these organizations work together with all other national biosecurity organizations. Under the Italian G7 presidency, these agencies would also be responsible for overseeing the following, as determined by the Global Partnership on Biosecurity Working Group:
- Materials to be Safeguarded and Supervised: Make sure all materials that could lead to biological proliferation are tracked down and kept safe.
- Work together with Biosafety Laboratories: Communicate with nearby biosafety laboratories to make sure that all substances and biological agents are traced and that standard disposal techniques are used to avoid unintentional non-state access.
- Create and Maintain Effective Protocols: Create and maintain effective protocols to stop, anticipate, identify, and thwart intentional mishandling of biological agents.
- Boost Detection Capabilities: Boost national and international resources to quickly identify illicit biological agent research.
In summary
Compared to other WMDs, biological warfare poses a greater hazard that is harder to obtain and harder to identify until it is too late to mitigate. Nations must establish organizations to manage biosecurity and shield populations from biological assaults on people, animals, and crops—even as international agreements and conventions are important. Separate actions should be taken to address mishaps including leaks, medication development, and food security, working with organizations to guarantee restricted non-state access, non-leakage, and proper disposal of biological agents. We can reduce the dangers of biological warfare and protect international security by being proactive and attentive in the face of new threats.