India's Border Strategy with Myanmar: Juggling Regional Complexities with Security Concerns

India's decision to fence its 1,610-kilometer border with Myanmar at a cost of US $3.7 billion has been brought to light in recent media reports. This move comes after the Free Regime Movement (FMR) agreement between the Indian and Myanmar governments was revoked. Under the previous arrangement, individuals from both countries may cross the border up to 16 kilometers without a visa. This stoppage is viewed as an essential step in addressing the ongoing problems in India's North East Region (NER), including drug trafficking and the flood of refugees from Myanmar, along with the installation of stringent military checkpoints. The choice to build a barrier along the border between India and Myanmar is not without its challenges, though. There are several obstacles to the effective implementation in this area, including the rugged terrain and the strong ethnic bonds between the border settlements.

Why Border Barriers Are Essential

Due in major part to its proximity to the Golden Triangle—a region that includes Northwestern Myanmar, Northern Laos, and Northwestern Thailand and is recognized as one of the world's largest drug trafficking hubs—India's North East Region has seen a considerable increase in drug trafficking since the 1970s. The Indo-Myanmar border is porous and unfenced, which has made it easier for drugs to enter India and has impacted the socioeconomic situation in the Northeast Region. Due to a significant rise in the growth of illicit crops, Myanmar emerged as the world's leading producer of opium in 2023, exacerbating the issue. According to official reports for the fiscal year 2022–2023 NER states captured contraband valued at approximately INR 2,000 Cr, or over US$267 million. Significant drug seizures and trafficker arrests have been recorded in Assam and Manipur, demonstrating the seriousness of the issue. The fact that this trend is expected to continue until 2024 emphasizes how urgently strict policies, such as border barriers, are needed to stop human trafficking.

The situation is further complicated by the migration of refugees from Myanmar, especially in the states of Mizoram and Manipur. Following Myanmar's military revolution in 2021, a large number of people fled to India's Northeast region in search of safety. Because of their shared ethnic heritage, Mizoram has been kind to these refugees, but it is unclear how long this hospitality will last. Because Mizoram is a landlocked state with a predominantly agrarian economy, there may be resource conflict between the new refugees and the local population. In order to manage immigration difficulties, India must enforce rigorous restrictions along the border. This is because the continuous war between the military of Myanmar and resistance organizations is expected to result in an even greater number of migrants.

What Difficulties Are There?

Different reactions have been received by political figures and organizations in the NER from the Indian government's decision to withdraw the FMR and suggest border fortification. There is strong opposition from other areas, even if the chief ministers of Assam, Arunachal Pradesh, and Manipur support the decision, citing the need to battle drug trafficking, unlawful refugee infiltration, and cross-border insurgency. The Mizoram assembly voted a motion opposing the idea, while Nagaland, which is ruled by the Bharatiya Janata Party, has opposed it. In addition, the National Socialist Council of Nagaland (Isak Muivah), a well-known Naga rebel organization that is presently negotiating a ceasefire with the Indian government, has voiced worries that the border wall may sever ethnic links between Naga populations on both sides of the divide. This demonstrates their desire for "Nagalim," a single Naga homeland that encompasses parts of both India and Myanmar.

The colonial-era border demarcation has been rejected by a number of tribal organizations from Manipur, Mizoram, and Nagaland, who have also expressed significant objection to the Central government's decision. They contend that the fencing might strengthen regionalist desires, strain ties with the Indian government, and ultimately drive them farther away from India. The presence of significant tribal populations along the Indo-Myanmar border underscores the interconnectedness of these communities. Given this demographic reality, border fencing and the FMR's termination may be huge grievances for individuals on both sides, potentially upsetting already-existing interpersonal relationships.

The Central government's choice also puts India's larger geopolitical goals in jeopardy, especially its Act East Policy, which aims to deepen relations with nations in Southeast Asia. Implementing border measures is extremely difficult because to the geographical complexity of the Indo-Myanmar border, which consists of high ridges and peaks in the north and low mountains in the south. The border has previously been fenced ineffectively; for instance, just 10 kilometers of border fencing between Manipur and Myanmar were finished in ten years. New Delhi's activities are further complicated by these logistical challenges, therefore a more nuanced approach is necessary.

In summary

The decision by India to fortify its border with Myanmar with fencing and to revoke the FMR creates a complex situation that could have unfavorable effects. Unquestionably, the porous border has made it easier for illicit enterprises to flourish, endangering the socioeconomic stability of the NER. However, the intricate topography and strong ethnic ties amongst the border areas make it more difficult to carry out this choice effectively. Important political individuals, rebel organizations, and local people in the NER may oppose New Delhi's Act East Policy, which might heighten regionalist ambitions and worsen already existing problems. India's border strategy with Myanmar needs to be balanced in order to solve these issues, taking into account both security considerations and the complex reality of the area.

India's Central Asian Foreign Policy

India's foreign policy is frequently examined due to its application in the Indo-Pacific area. It combines the impact of traditional culture with the new economic demands that have arisen from economic liberalization. But other important areas in India's "extended neighborhood," including Central Asia, which is strategically significant for India's security, may be eclipsed by the Indo-Pacific's significance. Current events highlight India's increased political involvement in Central Asia, especially when US soldiers leave Afghanistan in 2021.

The strategic importance of Central Asia

India's Increasing Engagement: India has become more politically involved in Central Asia, which includes Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The First India-Central Asia Summit in 2022 and the India-Central Asia Dialogue both attest to the increased interest. This strategic engagement, which seeks to strengthen India's position in this resource-rich region, is motivated by security concerns in the wake of the geopolitical changes following the departure from Afghanistan.

Politics' "Spaghetti Bowl" of Structures: The phrase "spaghetti bowl," which was first used in 1995 to define the intricate structure of US preferential trade agreements by Jagdish Bhagwati, a professor at Columbia University, effectively captures the essence of the contemporary political and economic climate in Central Asia. The Shanghai Cooperation Organization (SCO), the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO), and the Organization of Turkic States (OTS) are only a few of the overlapping frameworks that identify the region. The five Central Asian governments are not, nevertheless, united by a single governmental framework, despite the fact that great countries have always been drawn to the region due to its strategic importance as a hub for culture, transit, and energy resources.

Multilateral Engagement and Political Dynamics

Russia’s Security Focus and Perception: The Russian Federation’s 2023 Concept of Foreign Policy emphasizes the region’s strategic importance in regional integration and collective security, reinforcing Russia’s perception of Central Asia as a natural sphere of influence. For Russia's security, stability, and territorial integrity, the CIS is considered crucial. This policy paper indicates a multifaceted connection by emphasizing the expansion of trade, investment, and technology ties with India.

India's Position in the SCO: Russia supports enlarging the SCO's membership and extending its agenda in order to increase the organization's sway. Russia backed India's (and Pakistan's) admission into the SCO in 2017, against China's initial opposition. India sees the SCO as a way to keep a political presence in Eurasia, whereas Russia sees it largely as a security platform. India's political conflicts with China and Pakistan, which restrict its options inside the SCO, are the cause of this divergence. Nevertheless, despite obstacles like the possible ineffectiveness of the Regional Anti-Terrorist Structure (RATS) as a result of Indo-Pakistani disputes, the SCO continues to be an essential forum for communication for both countries.

China's Economic Ambitions: China primarily seeks to increase its influence in Central Asia through its approach to the SCO. However, within the SCO, security considerations are given priority by both Russia and India. Iran's admission as the SCO's ninth member may change this dynamic and enable the group to concentrate more on the economy, particularly with regard to infrastructure initiatives like the International North-South Transport Corridor (INSTC).

Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU) and INSTC economic cooperation

Russia's "Greater Eurasian" Partnership: Although its methods of execution are a little hazy, Russia's "Greater Eurasian" partnership seeks to unite Eurasia into a unified intercontinental region marked by mutual trust, peace, stability, progress, and prosperity. This vision mainly focuses on economic goals, supporting global trade-economic alliances and a network of free trade zones.

Trade and Economic Cooperation: When it comes to trade issues, Russia and India agree on two key points: working together within the framework of the EAEU and creating the INSTC. India's protectionism-based trade policy presents obstacles, but lowering import taxes via an FTA with the EAEU could increase Indian exports of pharmaceuticals, agricultural products, leather goods, machinery, and textiles while increasing Russian exports of chemical products, coal, and sunflower oil.

Realistic and difficult situations in practice

Trade Deficit and Negotiation Delays: Although hopes for more economic cooperation are high, real-world constraints moderate them. Negotiations may be delayed by external forces, and the concerns of the Indian business community may make things more difficult. There will probably be a rise in the trade imbalance, and existing trade and logistical routes need to be made more efficient. The 2022 Nord Stream gas pipeline sabotage highlighted the susceptibility of vital transportation infrastructure, hence calling for enhanced security protocols.

The INSTC exhibits potential as a strategic corridor, providing a viable substitute for the Suez Canal by potentially cutting delivery times and transportation expenses by thirty to forty percent. Russia's political objective in the Caspian area is to marginalize non-regional entities and offset China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) by counterbalancing competing initiatives such as the Middle Corridor (TMTM) and TRACECA (Transport Corridor Europe-Caucasus-Asia).

Central Asia's Importance of India-Russian Relations

High-Echelon collaboration: At the moment, India-Russian collaboration in Central Asia is classified as "high-echelon," with an emphasis on multilateral interactions as opposed to cooperative economic endeavors. This is part of a larger geopolitical plan in which both countries aim to use multilateral organizations like the SCO and EAEU to further their objectives.

Possibility of Deeper Economic Relations: India and Russia may have closer economic relations in Central Asia, notwithstanding the small number of cooperative economic projects. The growth of the INSTC and an FTA with the EAEU have the potential to spark further economic cooperation and increase trade volumes and logistical efficiency. The interest in the projects persisted even after the conflict in Ukraine, as evidenced by the visit to Iran in January by India's Foreign Minister S. Jaishankar and the signing of several concrete agreements by Russia and the Islamic Republic.

India as a Counterweight to China: Russia is optimistic about India's expanding involvement in Central Asia, especially in light of its potential to offset China's economic growth. Although there are some concerns about India's participation in the QUAD, it is acknowledged that the country is vital to the SCO and larger Eurasian endeavors. Though sometimes disregarded by Russian elites, the strengthening political relations between India and Central Asian countries underscore India's ability to bolster its economic and trade presence in the region.

In summary

India's foreign policy in Central Asia is characterized by a strategic involvement that is motivated by both economic and security considerations. The region's strategic significance to major powers such as China and Russia is reflected in the multilateral forms that characterize its complicated political and economic scene. India's determination to strengthening its footprint in this crucial region is demonstrated by its involvement in Central Asia, especially through organizations like the SCO and INSTC. Even though there are still obstacles to overcome, the possibility of closer economic relations and strategic collaboration presents a viable path for India's ongoing involvement in Central Asia, establishing it as a major actor in the changing geopolitical dynamics of the area.